We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: A Cannibal, Surreal & Subaltern Approach to Human Rights

This paper explores – briefly – four ideas: the concept of the ‘turn to emo­tions’, the notion of a can­ni­bal the­ory, legal sur­real­ism and the sub­al­tern per­spect­ive on human rights.

How we are to think and feel human rights today? This ques­tion is situ­ated in a spe­cific his­tor­ical con­text, that of our times, which is defined here as the age of Neo-​colonialism – the intens­i­fic­a­tion of the pro­cess of glob­al­isa­tion ini­ti­ated by the Con­quest of Amer­ica and the form­a­tion of the world mar­ket. Such a pro­cess does not only con­vene the mil­it­ary and eco­nomic dom­in­a­tion of most of the world by mod­ern empires. To a greater or lesser extent, the col­on­isa­tion of lan­guages, cul­tures and ways of think­ing has also been accom­plished.[i]

Col­on­isa­tion and the expan­sion through­out the world of mod­ern ration­al­ity are two phe­nom­ena inex­tric­able linked. They have made real one of the fea­tures of what Max Weber calls the ration­al­isa­tion of the world[ii]: the imper­ial expan­sion of a par­tic­u­lar way of think­ing – that of the mod­ern European ration­al­ity. No less cru­cial for this paper, the ques­tion con­cern­ing human rights today reclaims our atten­tion in an unusual fash­ion: It asks for a blip, a shift or a short-​circuit in the brain, in the skin, in the body – and in the intel­lec­tual mood of our epoch, in the spirit of the times. It requests sens­ib­il­isa­tion. It invites us not only to think human rights, but also to feel human rights.

For month after month, life in Yenan centred on inter­rog­a­tions and ter­ri­fy­ing mass ral­lies, at which some young volun­teers were forced to con­fess to being spies and to name oth­ers in front of large crowds who have been whipped into a frenzy. People who were named were then hois­ted onto the plat­form and pressed to admit their guilt… amidst hys­ter­ical slogan-​screaming. The fear gen­er­ated by these ral­lies was unbear­able. A close col­league of M remarked at the time that the ral­lies were ‘an extremely grave war on nerves. To some people, they are more dev­ast­at­ing than any kind of tor­ture.[iii]

The Turn to Emotions

Speak­ing of the ‘turn to emo­tions’ is usu­ally related to a tend­ency to make evid­ent the neg­lect in which emo­tions have remained in the dif­fer­ent dis­cip­lines of know­ledge, and to make the case for retriev­ing emo­tions for the­ory. Put in this way, we are in front of a schol­arly phe­nomenon that trans­verses the whole field of the arts, the human­it­ies, the social sci­ences, and even that of tech­no­logy and the nat­ural sci­ences. Not only dis­cip­lines like philo­sophy, soci­ology, his­tory and law have star­ted, over the last two dec­ades, to show symp­toms of this mal­adie. Sci­ences like neur­o­logy take issue with the Cartesian sev­er­ance of feel­ings from mind and think­ing, as in the case of the work of Ant­o­nio Dam­a­sio, who works on the inter­ac­tion of reason and emo­tions in the brain.[iv] Even those well advanced in the pro­duc­tion of robots are engaged in mak­ing them ‘more human’ by incor­por­at­ing sen­ti­ments in their hard disc.

I was like being a pris­oner on death row who sur­vives month after month and becomes accus­tomed to the life, while he registers with an object­ive eye the hor­ror of the new arrivals: registers it with the same numb­ness that he brings to the murders and deaths them­selves. All sur­vivor lit­er­at­ure talks about this numb­ness, in which life’s func­tions are reduced to a min­imum, beha­viour becomes com­pletely selfish and indif­fer­ent to oth­ers, and gass­ing and burn­ing are every­day occur­rences.[v]

This per­vas­ive trait in con­tem­por­ary the­ory is itself a symp­tom of some­thing else hap­pen­ing in his­tory. Mod­ern­ity pro­duced over the last five cen­tur­ies a new and spe­cific cul­ture of emo­tions. Elab­or­at­ing on Weber’s ana­lysis of the eth­ics of cap­it­al­ism, Adorno finds the core of mod­ern eth­ics in the Kan­tian call for a mor­al­ity based on duty, and strange to sen­ti­ments like sym­pathy.[vi] Moral stoicism and the cold­ness of European cul­ture are poin­ted by Adorno as cru­cial char­ac­ter­ist­ics of mod­ern civil­isa­tion.[vii] The Kan­tian inter­pret­a­tion of the Enlight­en­ment as the epoch in which it is pos­sible to think without tutors, makes autonomy depend­ent upon the exer­cise of reason. Sapere aude is the motto of mod­ern­ity. The turn to emo­tions entails a pro­cess of a sim­ilar nature, but of the oppos­ite sign. Our epoch, defined as Post­mod­ern­ity or as the times of the Decol­on­isa­tion of cul­ture[viii], would not be that of ration­al­isa­tion, but one of sens­ib­il­isa­tion. These are the times of moral global warm­ing – of the melt­ing of the cold mod­ern cul­ture. ‘Dare to feel’ is the motto of our age.

Thus ended the battle of Omdur­man –the most sig­nal tri­umph ever gained by the arms of sci­ence over bar­bar­i­ans. Within the space of five hours, the strongest and best armed sav­age army yet arrayed against a mod­ern European Power had been des­troyed.

The pos­sib­il­ity of the warm­ing of the global mod­ern cul­ture – the turn to emo­tions – con­veys a new defin­i­tion of the human, as well as dif­fer­ent paths for the con­struc­tion of com­munit­ies and the global soci­ety. Richard Rorty’s reflec­tion on emo­tions and the human rights cul­ture is very rel­ev­ant, as he advances the pro­ject of the actu­al­isa­tion of an eth­ics of moral emo­tions, includ­ing sym­pathy, in con­tem­por­ary soci­et­ies. For Rorty the most vis­ible char­ac­ter­istic of human beings is their plas­ti­city – their capa­city to be trans­formed by his­tory and cul­ture. Human beings and soci­et­ies would also have an abil­ity to recre­ate them­selves.[ix]

I was soon put down under the decks, and there I received such a saluta­tion in my nos­trils as I have never exper­i­enced in my life: so that, with the loath­some­ness of the stench and with my cry­ing together, I became so sick and low that I was not able to eat; but soon, to my grief, two of the white men offered me eat­ables; and, on my refus­ing to eat, one of them held me fast by the hands, while the other flogged me severely.[x]

Rorty believes moral enquiry needs to be placed within the over­rid­ing con­text of the need for the edu­ca­tion of soci­et­ies as a way to respond to the chal­lenges posed by his­tory. This pro­cess would entail a Gadamerian bildung, a prac­tice of cul­tiv­a­tion of the capa­cit­ies and tal­ents of human beings in which both reason and emo­tion par­ti­cip­ate.[xi] This pro­cess of fos­ter­ing the self is linked to a tend­ency to take dis­tance from the self and its par­tic­u­lar aims, and to fur­ther the open­ness to the other.[xii] It is in this sense that MacIntyre main­tains that ‘to act vir­tu­ously is not, as Kant was later to think, to act against inclin­a­tion; it is to act from inclin­a­tion formed by the cul­tiv­a­tion of the vir­tues. Moral edu­ca­tion is an “edu­ca­tion sen­ti­mentale”.’[xiii] This is a ver­it­able paideia to be developed by the sen­ti­mental edu­ca­tion of the epoch, a pro­ject aimed at modi­fy­ing the way the indi­vidual feels – a truth­ful attempt to recre­ate humans as emo­tional beings. But, as emo­tions exist not only at indi­vidual level but are also a col­lect­ive phe­nomenon, this task con­veys the shap­ing of the feel­ings of soci­et­ies, the global com­munity and of the era.

And this Diego de Landa says that he saw a tree from whose branches a cap­tain hanged many Indian women, and from their feet he also hanged the infant chil­dren.[xiv]

A Can­ni­bal Think­ing – and Feeling

The trope of the can­ni­bal was one of the main jus­ti­fic­a­tions for con­quest and col­on­isa­tion: the can­ni­bal peoples were in need of being civ­il­ised, and their deprav­ity vin­dic­ated any means to advance this enter­prise, includ­ing mass murder.[xv] In an anti-​colonial ges­ture and inspired by European van­guards – includ­ing Sur­real­ism – in his 1928 ‘Anthropof­a­gite Mani­festo’, the Bra­silian intel­lec­tual Osvald de Andrade embraced can­ni­bal­ism, and framed it as a cul­tural strategy for deal­ing with the European her­it­age. Devour­ing West­ern civil­isa­tion com­bines an aggress­ive and a con­struct­ive atti­tude. It is a rebel­lion against the impos­i­tion of imper­ial intel­lec­tual mod­els. This mas­tic­a­tion, swal­low­ing and diges­tion of West­ern cul­ture entail a crit­ical atti­tude: ‘The can­ni­bal devours the col­on­iser select­ively and crit­ic­ally, pro­du­cing a dia­lo­gical upset­ting’.[xvi] On the pro­duct­ive side, the crit­ical con­sump­tion of the European her­it­age res­ults in its re-​elaboration in the terms, and from the per­spect­ive, of the Third World. Such a pro­cess res­ults in a non-​dualist pro­cess of cul­tural and philo­soph­ical syn­cret­ism. ‘Anthro­po­phagy” is a ‘transcul­tural’ pro­ject of eman­cip­a­tion that thinks the col­on­ised world in ‘its dia­lo­gical rela­tion­ship with the uni­ver­sal’.[xvii]

The Chris­ti­ans cap­tured alive a hun­dred nat­ives and killed thirty. They cut the arms off some that they cap­tured, and the noses from oth­ers, and the breasts from the women.[xviii]

‘Four cen­tur­ies of beef! How dis­gust­ing’: Anthro­po­phagy does not stop at mak­ing a mock­ery of beef eat­ers. In a twist not devoid of Niet­z­schean con­nota­tions, it also invites us to think with the guts, as Anthro­po­phagy has no guid­ing ideas but ‘only stom­ach’.[xix] Bey­ond cri­tique and dia­logue, and bey­ond com­mon­al­it­ies with dia­lectics and decon­struc­tion, what kind of think­ing is being jok­ingly announced?

How­ever, the moment of suf­fer­ing came. I tried to count the lashes and think they were about sixty, apart from the kicks to his head and back. The cap­tain smiled with sat­is­fac­tion when he saw the boy’s thin garb soaked with blood. The boy lay there on the deck in his tor­ment, wrig­gling like a worm, and every time the cap­tain or one of the trad­ing agents passed him by, he was given a kick or sev­eral… I had to wit­ness all of this in silence.[xx]

In his ‘Anthro­po­phagite Mani­festo’ Andrade embraces as his own ‘the prim­it­ive men­tal­ity’ and scolds those who, like the French anthro­po­lo­gist Lucien Lévy-​Bruhl, labelled non-​European or non-​modern ways of think­ing as inferior: ‘Against all import­ers of canned con­scious­ness. The palp­able exist­ence of life.’[xxi] Lévy-​Bruhl had pub­lished in 1910 ‘Les Fonc­tions men­tales dans les soci­etés inférieures’ and in 1922 ‘La Men­tal­ité prim­it­ive’, in which he stud­ied the so-​called pre-​logical men­tal­ity of the ‘prim­it­ives’ and described it as a way of think­ing dis­tant to the prin­ciple of non-​contradiction. Pos­it­ing an oppos­i­tion between ‘prim­it­ive’ and ‘civ­il­ised’ thought, Lévy-​Bruhl could envis­age only one pos­sible out­come from their col­li­sion: the neces­sity for the prim­it­ive to evolve towards the civ­il­ised and logical think­ing. The oppos­ite is the truth for Andrade’s cri­tique of ration­al­ism, which rebuffs ration­al­ism and the col­on­isa­tion of the prim­it­ive thinking.

Legal Sur­real­ism

Legal Sur­real­ism sub­stan­tially coin­cides with the cannibal’s account. Luis Alberto Warat points out in his 1988 ‘Mani­festo of Legal Sur­real­ism’ that mod­ern reason became hege­monic in world cul­ture, des­pot­ic­ally put­ting aside those ways of think­ing in which reason is not in com­mand. West­ern ration­al­ity is accom­pan­ied by a pecu­liar atti­tude of hos­til­ity towards dif­fer­ence, in par­tic­u­lar towards emo­tions. Reason, ‘logo­centrism’ or ‘phalo­go­centrism’ carry an ‘abso­lute power’ [xxii] that tyr­an­nic­ally takes pos­ses­sion of every sphere of cul­ture, driv­ing out emo­tion and heart, and con­demning feel­ings to exile.

First they applied the tor­ture of the screws, then they poured hot candle grease on his belly, then they put his feet in irons through which a stick was thrust that could betwis­ted, and they set fire at his feet.[xxiii]

For Warat, mod­ern ration­al­ity can be described as a Manichean appar­atus that ‘ignores the pas­sion­ate sub­ject’ and as a world ‘where one loses also the right to pas­sions’.[xxiv] It is also a hier­arch­ical machine that cuts apart human beings into two, and loc­ates reason in the higher level of the ‘truly human’, while dis­places pas­sions, to the lower rank of the unworthy.[xxv] Ulti­mately, mod­ern ration­al­ity is a fea­ture of cap­it­al­ist cul­ture, and can be described as a ‘mar­ket ration­al­ity that brings about the dom­in­a­tion of the logic of sen­ti­ments’.[xxvi]

A small boy of about nine is ordered by the sol­dier to cut off the dead man’s hand, which, with some other hands taken pre­vi­ously in a sim­ilar way, are then the fol­low­ing day handed over to the com­mis­sioner as signs of the vic­tory of civil­iz­a­tion.[xxvii]

For Legal Sur­real­ism there is a need for ‘decol­on­ising ima­gin­a­tion’, for chal­len­ging ‘the mono­poly of reason’ and for ‘sub­vert­ing’ ‘West­ern ration­al­ity’.[xxviii] This trans­lates into an exer­cise of ‘res­ist­ance to ali­en­a­tion’, and as a way of achiev­ing eman­cip­a­tion.[xxix] Legal sur­real­ism invites us to ‘embrace a prim­it­ive gaze’ and a ‘prim­it­ive think­ing’.[xxx] The prim­it­ive men­tal­ity of Warat’s ‘late sur­real­ism’ entails a ‘revolu­tion out of sen­ti­ment’ that endeav­ours to appre­hend the world ‘much more by means of emo­tions than by means of thought’, and while assert­ing that it is our pas­sions which make us human, it looks for some rebal­an­cing that brings emo­tion and reason into a fruit­ful cooper­at­ive rela­tion.[xxxi]

Some Chris­ti­ans encountered an Indian woman, who was car­ry­ing in her arms a child at suck; and since the dog they had with them was hungry, they tore the child from the mother’s arms and flung it still liv­ing to the dog, which pro­ceeded to devour him before the mother’s eyes.[xxxii]

Sub­al­tern The­ory of Human Rights

Upen­dra Baxi’s intro­duc­tion of ‘the lan­guage of the viol­ated’[xxxiii] trans­forms the human rights dis­course. Speak­ing from the per­spect­ive of the vic­tim cre­ates a human rights dis­course that is dis­played in terms of suf­fer­ing. One is obliged to con­front nakedly the fact of suf­fer­ing. For the vic­tims, viol­ence has mater­ial con­sequences in body and mind, and is cause of phys­ical or psy­cho­lo­gical pain. A human rights the­ory can be con­struc­ted as a response to human and social suf­fer­ing because ‘the authen­tic­ally sub­al­tern utter­ance has no other lan­guage that would enable the viol­ated to express this viol­ence’.[xxxiv]

They summoned a great num­ber of Indi­ans, more than two hun­dred… The Span­iards cut their faces from the nose and lips down to the chin and sent them in this lam­ent­able con­di­tion, stream­ing with blood.[xxxv]

Baxi’s char­ac­ter­ises the Third World as ‘the suf­fer­ing human­ity’[xxxvi]. In this notion the Third World is defined in terms of the pain endured over cen­tur­ies as a con­sequence of imper­i­al­ism. Suf­fer­ing becomes a cru­cial aspect of the his­tory of the Third World, of mil­lions of indi­vidual lives turned to misery or des­troyed. This is the unbear­able pain of a child torn to pieces and devoured by dogs; the infin­ite pain of his mother, from whose breast he was pulled away.

And all over the place. Oh man! You hear suf­fer­ing and pain.[xxxvii]

This is a suf­fer­ing that per­meates and taints the entire his­tory of con­tin­ents and our era. It is a pain that gets con­foun­ded with the spirit of the times. Speak­ing about how the 20^th cen­tury his­tory of the European Jews can be sum­mar­ised in the word Aus­chwitz, Lyo­tard has said that ‘there is a sort of grief in the Zeit­geist’.[xxxviii] The agony evoked by the words ‘a suf­fer­ing human­ity’ is of this qual­ity. It is an afflic­tion that evokes and con­venes the tor­ment of so many for so long.

Left Equator at eleven o’clock this morn­ing after tak­ing on a cargo of one hun­dred small slaves, prin­cip­ally seven – or eight – year-​old boys, with a few girls among the batch, all stolen from the nat­ives… Of the liberes, brought down the river, many die. They are badly cared for: no clothes to wear in the rainy sea­son, sleep where there is no shel­ter, and no atten­tion when sick. Their offence is that their fath­ers and broth­ers fought for a little inde­pend­ence.[xxxix]

In speak­ing about sens­ib­il­ity as a com­pet­ence for feel­ing emo­tions, Baxi is not only refer­ring to an abil­ity resid­ing in indi­vidu­als but also to a ‘moral col­lect­ive sen­ti­ment’[xl]. In the frame­work of a med­it­a­tion on human rights loc­ated in the hori­zon of the world-​system, the col­lect­ive nature of the cap­ab­il­ity for feel­ings extends well bey­ond the bor­ders of soci­ety. In the times of glob­al­isa­tion, such a fac­ulty has world­wide con­tours. Baxi pos­tu­lates the exist­ence of a ‘global affectiv­ity’, or a ‘global moral sen­ti­ment’, which would be part of our con­tem­por­ary global cul­ture.[xli]

I’M GOOD HAMLET GI’ME A CAUSE FOR GRIEF

AH THE WHOLE GLOBE FOR A REAL SORROW[xlii]

Re-​thinking human rights from the point of view of the sub­al­tern does not only lead to the intro­duc­tion of the lan­guage of the suf­fer­ing of the vic­tims of the Third World in the dis­course of human rights, but also to the descrip­tion of human rights cul­ture as a web of emo­tions and to the adop­tion of global sens­ib­il­ity as a reser­voir and a source for the struggle for human rights. The pres­ence of a layer or a sphere of emo­tions in con­tem­por­ary cul­ture has not only cul­tural con­nota­tions but also moral rami­fic­a­tions. This re-​interpretation of human rights also has to do with a re-​thinking of the eth­ics of rights. The mor­al­ity elab­or­ated under the mod­ern premises of reason needs to be com­ple­men­ted by a dia­logue with an eth­ics that finds its con­tent in this pool of emo­tions that is part of the global cul­ture. For Baxi, this new eth­ics of human rights is an ‘emer­ging global eth­ics… of move­ments of human solid­ar­ity’.[xliii] Not sur­pris­ingly, Baxi agrees with Rorty’s adop­tion of lit­er­at­ure – or telling stor­ies – as the more attuned tool to advance the sens­ib­il­isa­tion of the mod­ern cold cul­ture, and to make it more respons­ive to human and social suf­fer­ing.[xliv]

We wish to inform you that tomor­row we will be killed with our fam­il­ies.[xlv]

— — — — — — — — — —

This paper was presen­ted at the Crit­ical Legal Con­fer­ence 2010, held at the School of Law, Uni­ver­sity of Utrecht. A paper for two voices – female and male, European and Non-​European — it was read by Becca Franssen and the author.

[i] W. Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renais­sance. Lit­er­acy, Ter­rit­ori­al­ity & Col­on­iz­a­tion (Ann Arbor: Uni­ver­sity of Michigan Press, 2003).

[ii] M. Weber, The Prot­est­ant Ethic and the Spirit of Cap­it­al­ism (Lon­don: Unwin Uni­ver­sity Books, 1971), 119.

[iii] J. Chang and J. Hal­l­i­day, Mao. The Unkown Story (Lon­don: Vin­tage, 2007), 299.

[iv] A. Dam­a­sio, Descartes’ Error: Emo­tion, Reason, and the Human Brain (Lon­don: Vin­tage, 1995). See also A. Dam­a­sio, The Feel­ing of what Hap­pens: Body and Emo­tion in the Mak­ing of Con­scious­ness (Lon­don: Vin­tage, 2000), and A. Dam­a­sio, Look­ing for Spinoza: Joy, Sor­row and the Human Brain (Lon­don: Heine­mann, 2003).

[v] B. Schlink, The Reader (Lon­don: Phoenix, 1998), 100 – 101.

[vi] ‘The prin­ciple of apathy, that is, that the prudent man at no time be in a state of emo­tion, not even in that of sym­pathy with the woes of his best friend, is an entirely cor­rect and sub­lime moral pre­cept’. I. Kant, Anthro­po­logy from a Prag­matic point of View (Car­bondale: South­ern Illinois Uni­ver­sity Press, 1978), 158.

[vii]T. Adorno, Neg­at­ive Dia­lectics (Lon­don: Rout­ledge, 1973), 363.

[viii] On the Deco­lo­nial Turn see W. Mignolo “DELINKING: The Rhet­oric of mod­ern­ity, the logic of colo­ni­al­ity and the gram­mar of de-​coloniality,” Cul­tural Stud­ies 21 (2007): 449 – 514.

[ix] R. Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Ration­al­ity and Sen­ti­ment­al­ity’, in S. Shute and S. Hur­ley, eds., On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lec­tures 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 1994).

[x] O. Equiano, The Inter­est­ing Nar­rat­ive, (Lon­don: Pen­guin, 2003), 186.

[xi] R. Rorty, Philo­sophy and the Mir­ror of Nature, (Prin­centon: PUP, 1979), 359 & 363.

[xii] H-​G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (Lon­don: Shed and Ward, 1998), 11 & 17.

[xiii] A. MacIntyre, After Vir­tue. A Study in Moral The­ory (Lon­don: Duck­worth, 1981), 140.

[xiv] B. de las Casas, Short Account of the Destruc­tion of the Indies (Lon­don: Pen­guin, 1992).

[xv] P. Hulme, ‘The Can­ni­bal Scene’, in F. Barker et. al. eds., Can­ni­bal­ism and the Colo­nial World (Cam­bridge: CUP, 1998), 14 – 15.

[xvi] C. Per­rone, Seven Faces. Brazilian Poetry since Mod­ern­ism (Durham: Duke Uni­ver­sity Press, 1996), 52.

[xvii] Quoted in Prado-​Bellei, ‘Brazilian anthro­po­logy revis­ited’, in F. Barker et​.al. eds., Can­ni­bal­ism and the Colo­nial World (Cam­bridge: CUP, 1998), 101.

[xviii]Juan de Tur­uegano, quoted by B. de las Casas, supra n. 14.

[xix] Supra 17, at 91& 93.

[xx] E.W. Sjoblom, quoted by S. Lindqv­ist, Exterm­in­ate all the Brutes (Lon­don: Granta, 1998), 20.

[xxi] O. de Andrade, Anthro­po­phagite Mani­festo, http://​www​.crit​ic​al​leg​al​think​ing​.com/​?​p​=​5​7​0​#​m​o​r​e​-​570

[xxii] L.A. Warat, Mani­festo of Legal Sur­real­ism, http://​www​.crit​ic​al​leg​al​think​ing​.com/​?​p​=​602

[xxiii] Supra n. 14.

[xxiv] Supra n. 22.

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] Ibid.

[xxvii] E.W. Sjoblom, quoted by S. Lindqv­ist, supra 20, at 23 – 24

[xxviii] Supra n. 22.

[xxix] Ibid.

[xxx] Ibid.

[xxxi] Ibid.

[xxxii] Supra n. 14.

[xxxiii] U. Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Delhi and Oxford: OUP, 2002), 4 and 126.

[xxxiv] U. Baxi, ‘Global Justice and the Fail­ure of Delib­er­at­ive Demo­cracy’, in O. Enwezor, et​.al., eds., Demo­cracy Unreal­ised. Doc­u­menta 11 – Plat­form 1(Ost­fildern Ruit: Hatje Cantz Pub­lish­ers, 2002) 126.

[xxxv] Supra n. 14.

[xxxvi] Supra n. 34, at 113 – 114.

[xxxvii] R. Mos­quera –a mem­ber of a com­munity of black peas­ants vic­tims of the Colom­bian armed conflict.

[xxxviii] J-​F. Lyo­tard, The Post­mod­ern Explained: Cor­res­pond­ence, 1982 – 1985 (Min­neapolis: The Uni­ver­sity of Min­nesota Press, 1997), 78.

[xxxix] E.J. Glave, quoted by S. Lindqv­ist, supra n. 20, at 22 – 23

[xl] Supra 33, at 41 .

[xli] Supra n. 34, at 116.

[xlii] H. Mueller, The Ham­let­ma­chine

[xliii] Supra 34, at 116.

[xliv] Supra n. 33, at 113.

[xlv] P. Goure­vitch, We wish to inform you that tomor­row we will be killed with our fam­il­ies: Stor­ies from Rwanda (New York, Pic­ador, 1998).

Tags: Series: Surrealism

This entry was posted on 25 November 2010 at 12:15 am and is filed under Critical Legal Conference 2010, Critical Legal Theory, Human Rights, Jurisprudence, Political Philosophy, Series: Surrealism. Published under Creative Commons (CC) Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License: You are welcome to share and remix this content for non-commercial purposes. Kindly acknowledge and hyperlink the source.