The Muppet Show

15 March 2012
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Greg Smith’s resig­na­tion let­ter in the New York Times yes­ter­day,1 announ­cing a bridge-​burning depar­ture from his pos­i­tion as Exec­ut­ive Dir­ector of Gold­man Sachs’ Equity Deriv­at­ives Divi­sion (Europe, Asia, Africa) cer­tainly brought Wall St. to a rel­at­ive halt. GS can­celled con­fer­ence calls and the Gold­man Flacks (PR goons) were roun­ded up to pour scorn on Mr. Smiths alleg­a­tions as “unrecognisable”.

The import­ance of the let­ter was not so much it’s rev­el­a­tion of a eat-​what-​you-​kill cul­ture in which cli­ents are the main course, not even the con­ten­tion that some­how GS had changed cul­ture — it hadn’t any more than any other invest­ment bank since the Big Bang. The let­ter was import­ant because it effect­ively took GS cli­ents’ faces and slammed them against the res­taur­ant win­dow, through which they could now see their GS con­tact engaged in anthro­po­pha­gia between rauc­ous tales of how the cur­rent dish had of its own voli­tion signed up to sit on the plate.

Gold­man cli­ents, Smith informs the world, have been reg­u­larly called “mup­pets” who are there to have the “eyes-​gouged”. Such accus­a­tions come as no sur­prise to your author. In the Short His­tory of the Credit Crunch we detailed how it was not just equity deriv­at­ives (Smith’s milieu) but cor­por­ate fin­ance, CMBS, and restruc­tur­ing which from our own exper­i­ence were shot through with the same atti­tude — that the cli­ent of a bank was the primary vic­tim of the bank’s activ­it­ies. We recoun­ted how in one par­tic­u­lar restruc­tur­ing in the auto-​sector, it became mani­fest that the lead banks for the restruc­tur­ing, though being paid six fig­ures in fees for their restruc­tur­ing advice, saw the company’s troubles as an oppor­tun­ity to squeeze whatever remain­ing value out of the patient. Thus this same com­pany was required to pay restruc­tur­ing fees, amend­ment fees, and a ridicu­lous hike in its mar­gin pay­ments. To top it all, the lead banks screwed the remain­ing banks of the syn­dic­ate by demand­ing addi­tional secret fees be paid (again six fig­ures) thus fur­ther neg­at­ing sav­ings derived from cost cut­ting. We con­cluded that this pro­cess of see­ing every crisis as an oppor­tun­ity by drain­ing the patient was in the pro­cess of being raised to the level of sov­er­eign fin­ance. Greece, among oth­ers, ended up being in the line of fire.

Which of course leads us back to Gold­man Sachs: not only did it advise the Greek gov­ern­ment on how to hide its debts — remem­ber­ing that by “advise” we mean “gouged its eyes out” — but as a reward a scion of GS, Papa­demos, was installed as Technocrat-​in-​chief. The same happened in Italy. The rel­ev­ance of this is that it con­sti­tutes the bound­ary con­di­tion on the effic­acy of Smith’s let­ter. Any other pro­fes­sional firm would be in deep trouble fol­low­ing such rev­el­a­tion, and dir­ect­ors of GS cli­ents may yes­ter­day have con­sidered a forth­right phone call at the least to express dis­pleas­ure. No-​one seems to have con­sidered whether it would be a breach of dir­ect­ors’ duties to con­tinue to employ Gold­man Sachs, given that it appar­ently exists to choose the worst options for their cli­ents. But the prob­lem is that GS is too big and cov­ers too many bases. With Bear Ste­arns and Lehmans out of the pic­ture, and JP Mor­gan and Mer­rill Lynch still feel­ing the head­ache of forced mer­gers, Gold­man Sachs seemed to have sur­vived the Crunch strengthened and backed by its links in the Fed­eral Reserve and across national gov­ern­ments. This reg­u­lat­ory annex­a­tion, com­bined with its pos­i­tion as an adviser to issuers, mar­ket maker, and own-​account trader, meant it is not just a “Big-​Swinging-​Dick” in the mar­ket to use 1980’s Wall St. ver­nacu­lar2; it is the mar­ket. In the face of such gen­er­al­ity of pres­ence, it will prove dif­fi­cult for cor­por­ate and sov­er­eign cli­ents to “choose” to take their busi­ness else­where. Cer­tainly there has been an “under­stand­ing” in the Euro­zone that local banks are to be pre­ferred in future, but local banks, such as Société Générale, are hardly free from the bank­ing cul­ture that Smith describes.

Thus the pos­sib­il­ity of mass defec­tion is tempered from within by mar­ket dom­in­ance and from without by the grudging accept­ance that Gold­man Sachs’ despo­li­ation of cli­ents is par of the course in our fin­an­cial­ised world. It is to be accep­ted as the price of being per­mit­ted access to cap­ital flows. With that choice, per­haps we should not be sur­prised that many cor­por­ates, already hoard­ing cash as a pro­tec­tion against a second slump, have also already become very wary of invest­ment bankers’ schemes, with res­ult­ant notice­able falls in LBO and M&A activ­ity in the last couple of years. What was always known has merely become blatant, yet still there is a col­lect­ive hold­ing of breath. There are many poten­tials in the cur­rent global cli­mate, wait­ing to be put to work. This is what Gram­sci would call an organic phase, in which we can­not be sure what will spring forth. I am reminded of the fires one sees on peat moors in the north and west of Bri­tain. Peat is very rich in energy and can be burnt as a poor fuel, but it shuts out oxy­gen from its bio­mass. Peat can begin burn­ing and no-​one is the wiser, due to the slow-​burn in anaer­obic con­di­tions. A fire can spread over acres without sign, save per­haps to touch the sur­face a little heat is detec­ted. Greg Smith’s let­ter, fail­ing to cause dam­age of imme­di­ate sig­ni­fic­ance, may well be such a slow burner: an act of rev­el­at­ory arson.

Show 2 foot­notes

  1. Prin­ted also in the Guard­ian http://​www​.guard​ian​.co​.uk/​c​o​m​m​e​n​t​i​s​f​r​e​e​/​2​0​1​2​/​m​a​r​/​1​4​/​g​o​l​d​m​a​n​-​s​a​c​h​s​-​w​h​y​-​i​-​r​e​s​i​g​ned
  2. cf. M. Lewis, Liar’s Poker p.56

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