In his book Freedom a Disease Without Cure, (2023), Slavoj Žižek draws a lengthy critique of my article “Many Worlds Interpretation, Critical Theory and the (Immanent) Paradox of Power.” The critique stands on a tripod (we will develop below). 1. Difference necessitates pre-existing identities, 2. Experienced reality might be more contingent than quantum proto-reality, and 3. My focus on power as domination (“potestas”) overshadows its importance as potentia.

Essentially, my thesis hinges on a fundamental paradox, and I believe Žižek’s critique might have missed this crucial element, which demands an engagement that acknowledges and grapples with its paradoxical nature, rather than attempting a straightforward logical refutation. In doing the latter, he inadvertently ends up reinforcing the point I want to make. 

The paradox, as I initially laid out in my book Being and Contingency: Decrypting Heidegger’s Terminology, is as follows,

If there is an infinity of multiple parallel worlds (or universes) then it is absolutely necessary that there is a world where multiple parallel worlds are impossible, hence the infinity of multiple parallel worlds is limited and thus finite (Sanín-Restrepo 2021).

This is not a formal logical deduction; it is a paradox that takes formal logic to the abyss^[i]. As a paradox it challenges formal logic by introducing self-referential contradiction. As we know classical logic relies on consistency and non-contradiction, but this paradox disrupts those principles by asserting that the very condition of infinity necessitates its own negation. It operates similarly to other paradoxes that question the limits of logical systems, such as Russell’s paradox in set theory or Gödel’s incompleteness theorems in mathematics.

Note that Žižek’s critique is not directed either at the construction of the paradox nor entirely at the conclusions I draw from it, but at one of the extremes of the paradox which he treats as a formal logical proposition and not a paradoxical conclusion or solution, wherein lies the power of my argument^[ii]. 

Before delving into Žižek’s critique, let us unravel the paradox. Multiple worlds are infinite (contingent, permanent becoming and intensive potentiality) but the premise must admit that there has to be a world where these multiple worlds are impossible, this is a logical and necessary conclusion, hence the infinity of multiple parallel worlds is limited and thus finite (the paradox, or paradoxically). This is the heart of the paradox, a powerful metaphor, and what allows me to build a different truth on top of it. As such, this is not what is central to my argument, this is the tail of the paradoxical snake that Žižek bites on as if were the whole truth of the situation. 

As Kripke reminds us “Possible worlds are stipulated, not discovered by powerful telescopes.” (Kripke 1980, 45). What makes the paradox powerful is that it leads to identifying or at least stipulating such a world. 

What world? Where other worlds are not possible, hence, the mere possibilities of other worlds are frozen in necessity, and, becoming other is impossible, only sheer identity and unanimity, a world of no contraries and no contingency, of no event and no becoming. The poetic conclusion that I draw from this is that this world, our very own world, when dominated by potestas (power as domination and thus negation of contingency) is the very world we are referring to as impossible…we live in an impossible world and thus a mere simulacrum of a world^[iii].

In a way it is science fiction, and as such, as Ursula K Le Guin taught us, “truth is in the imagination”. It is a thought experiment that is not predictive but descriptive, and not about the future but about the present (Le Guin 2019). The construction is simple, its poetic and metaphoric, thus its political conclusions are complex. When I say poetics I am referring to its radical meaning, as Aristotle argues it deals with universals “what might happen” rather than particulars “what has happened”, which is the domain of history. 

I believe this is not only a beautiful paradox, but a logical one. The political point I make, derived from the paradox, is that this world we live in if it is dominated by potestas it becomes “impossible” – the world where the multiplicity of worlds is denied – as the realm of “potestas”, which, as I define it, is domination achieved through the negation of difference, cannot stand. Consequently, we are forced to recognize that potentia and contingency are the only possibility of there being a world. Here, the opposition between contingency and necessity becomes central to my defense against Žižek’s confrontation. 

Žižek’s critique of my article, centers on several key points: he argues that difference requires pre-existing identities, challenging my emphasis on the primacy of contingency. He also suggests that experienced reality might be more contingent than the quantum proto reality. Most importantly, Žižek highlights the importance of power as potentia, which he feels my concept of “potestas” as domination might overshadow. To this third point I will simply answer that basically all of my work, developed through a panoply of books and articles, is directed at proving that a world without potentia is the negation of the world. Ok, but even granting that the critique is only directed at this specific piece, we can draw the same conclusion easily. What I prove is that a world reliant on potestas denies potentia. This is what Žižek is missing in the poetic exercise of the paradox, it is very simple: If there are infinite worlds, a world where infinite worlds are impossible must exist, and therefore, that world is the negation of potentia. This is not contradictory, it is paradoxical, and from that gap I draw a firm conclusion.

As we can see, the paradox, and its conclusion, is not that “potestas” is necessary, all the complete opposite, if potestas is necessary then potentia cannot exist, but this is precisely what I am denouncing. The paradox stands as logical if we admit that such a world of potestas exists. And here is where Žižek’s critique goes astray, for logically, when a critique is grounded in a fallacious premise that diametrically opposes the initial proposition, its elaboration invariably reinforces the very claim it seeks to refute, demonstrating a performative contradiction. In other, simpler words, a critique built upon a fundamental misinterpretation, inverting the original thesis, risks unintentionally validating the proposition it aims to dismantle. This is what happens in what we just depicted above. 

The point the paradox and its conclusion are making is not the primacy of potestas but its submission to potentia, and its sealed-in place as an aberration. Now, given this new conclusion to one of his critiques (the third) you will logically understand that the two previous ones “difference requires pre-existing identities, and, that reality might be more contingent than the quantum proto reality” fall down as well. Regarding the first one, the aberration of potestas shows that you cannot deny difference if there are no identities first, denying difference is a form of identity. Regarding the last one, as a call made by Žižek to the complexity of reality, the answer from the paradox is “Oh yeah, we know, that is what the paradox is trying to tell you, it is what it ascertains, reality is so complex it can problematize the idea of infinity itself”. 

As seen, the text uses MWI as a poetic lens to critique power structures, suggesting that the very idea of infinite possibilities underscores how our current reality, shaped by “potestas” is a constrained and unrealized version of what could be, of a possible world where all worlds become possible. Consequently, my article concludes “Potestas is the contradiction of existence. That which cannot exist outside itself, that which is not even different in itself. Insofar, democracy, as the infinite extension of intense difference, is necessary in all possible worlds.”

 Furthermore, Žižek questions whether the MWI’s infinite realities leave room for genuine possibility. He proposes the necessity of a single “milieu” reality to ground other possible worlds and emphasizes the role of intersubjectivity in scientific truth. The answer is robustly given in my article which he seems to overlook and not wanting to break the flow of the arguments I’ve copied in an endnote^[iv].

The key to it all rests in the interplay between contingency and necessity, as I put it before, following on the footsteps of Quentin Meillassoux (2008),

While contingency is the unleashing of immanence, generation, transitions, and creativity; necessity is the sovereign grip of every definition of time and space from a predefined point zero. While in necessity, the contingency of the future is captured in what is presently actual; contingency is the edge where possible and impossible are to be decided. Contingency is always the unbound multiplicity of becoming. Hence, there is no expression of difference that is not contingent as there is no negation of difference that does not always fall back into necessity. Contingency and necessity are then the gridlocks of power, that is, of what is possible and impossible. (Sanín-Restrepo 2018, xi).

In my framework, “potestas” functions by transforming inherently contingent differences into rigid and fixed identities, thus imposing a system of necessity that severely limits the intrinsic fluidity and potentiality of existence. This imposition of necessity results in what I call a “simulacrum” of the world, a seemingly stable and unchangeable reality that actively suppresses the infinite possibilities suggested by the Many Worlds Interpretation.

As previously stated, 

In considering multiple worlds, it is clear that potestas is the world that has no other possible world. It possesses no ‘contrary’ to it, no underworld that would rise to annihilate it. Precisely its most hideous and effective feature is that it has no reflection, no double side, it is a frozen state of identity and oppression. Potestas is thus the paradox of existence. That which cannot exist outside itself, that which is not even different in itself. (Sanín-Restrepo 2021, 99)

If the aforementioned is true, then we are not before a paradox in “any world,” but a contradiction in “this world”, if potestas rules there is no world, thus we are forced to recognize that before the brutality of the state, the violent enclosures of capital that pose as the only possible world, potentia and contingency are the only truth of the world, the only route to break the simulacrum. 

That is why when addressing Žižek’s specific points, a turn is necessary, a change of lexical repertory if you will, in order to frame his critique through the lens of this fundamental opposition between contingency and necessity. For instance, regarding the contingency inherent in quantum collapse, I clarify that I see the quantum realm as representing pure potentiality – a domain of unbound contingency. The “collapse” into a single, observed reality, from my perspective, is precisely the moment where “potestas” intervenes, imposing necessity by selecting and solidifying one possibility out of an infinite array. The contingency we experience in our everyday reality is therefore a constrained and mediated form of contingency.

Similarly, when Žižek discusses power as potential, I want to emphasize that “potestas,” in my understanding, is not merely about eroding a latent potentia. Rather, it is the very system that structures and severely limits this potentia through the establishment of necessity, thereby maintaining fixed hierarchies and identities. My core paradox itself is designed to highlight how the seemingly limitless possibilities offered by MWI paradoxically necessitate the existence of a world – our world under the sway of “potestas” – where such multiplicity is denied, illustrating how the paradoxical necessity of a single, limited reality within a potentially infinite field of contingency is an aberration.

Ultimately, my disagreement rests on the argument that this paradoxical and poetic approach is not merely a stylistic choice but is absolutely essential for truly grasping the insidious nature of “potestas.” By exposing the paradoxical necessity of a world that actively negates contingency, I aim to reveal the inherent limitations and oppressive characteristics of domination and to advocate for the embrace of contingency (Meillassouxian absolute contingency) as the very foundation of genuine freedom and the full realization of all possible worlds. The tension between the boundless potentiality of the quantum realm, which I see as representing ultimate contingency, and the constrained reality we experience, so heavily shaped by “potestas” and its imposition of necessity, remains the central axis of my argument and my response to Žižek’s critique.

Bibliography 

Aristotle. Poetics. Perseus Digital Library. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/

Everett, Hugh. 1973. The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.  The Theory of the Universal Wave Function.https://www-tc.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/manyworlds/pdf/dissertation.pdf

Kripke, Saul. 1980. Naming and necessity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press

Le Guin, Ursula K. 2019. The Left Hand of Darkness. London: Penguin.

Meillassoux, Quentin. 2008. After Finitude. An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. Translated by Ray Brassier. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Sanín-Restrepo, Ricardo. 2018. “The Meaning of the Encryption of Power as the Razor´s Edge of Politics”. In: Sanín-Restrepo, Ricardo. Decrypting Power. London & New York:  Rowman and Littlefield

Sanín-Restrepo, Ricardo. 2021. Being and Contingency: Decrypting Heidegger’s Terminology. London: Rowman & Littlefield International. 

Sanín-Restrepo, Ricardo. 2021. “Many Worlds Interpretation, Critical Theory and the (Immanent) Paradox of Power.” In https://criticallegalthinking.com/2021/11/22/many-worlds-interpretation-critical-theory-and-the-immanent-paradox-of-power/

Žižek, Slavoj. 2023. Freedom: A Disease Without Cure. London: Bloomsbury Academic

^[i] The superpower of the paradoxical is that it creates novelty without a preexistent model. It breaks the siege of any regime of predictability anchored in the utter control of time, space, and beings. Eroding necessity and its rule of brutality, it allows us to see, feel and partake of the world again.

^[ii] Henceforth, my main argument is not about Multiple World Interpretations (MWI), but about power and its potentiality, MWI is simply the lever that helps me to illustrate the political force of it, this is not to say my interpretation of MWI is wrong, simply that this is not the point of my argument.

^[iii] The only way out of this simulacrum is by inverting it and thus revamping contingency through unbridled potentiality I will not deal with this aspect directly here, but it is the basis of my book “Being and Contingency (2021)

^[iv] Although I believe I have lifted Žižek’s critique through the paradox, this point is also answered in the article which he does not refer to: “To the question of what is a now, what is a fact logically follows. What is (the) instant? We must think of the time it takes for a fact to be formed (distinctive fact), but then the problem is to settle what a distinctive fact means or represents, or how it can be named. Are we inside the total dependence of the fact to the relation and the latter as our capacity to displace time from itself? Can we only perceive the words “difference” “multiplicity” as they leave our actuality but not their probable outcome in another world? “Another world” becomes through the exercise of “this” difference and to what it is that is blocked there by a form of identity that we must recognize as coming forth from our world.

However, the paradox meets a melting point. Accordingly, at every quantic event the universe is divided into two parallel opposed universes (or worlds). Whatever happens in one, the exact contrary happens in the other. What is troublesome is the idea of the “contrary” when enouncing the possibility of endless parallel universes. Does not “contrary” mean one? Does it mean we know then what the state of affairs are at any given moment in any given space-time, so we declare (prove) that the contrary has happened? “Contrary” necessarily supposes a system of equivalence with a hard identity as its origin (Sanín-Restrepo 2020). What is utterly problematic is that the idea of contraries is anchored in binarity, and not any kind of binarity, but one that begs the necessity to decide between normality and exception, between positives and negatives. As if these terms could be given from one single states of affairs that holds within it every form of identity. If the latter is true, then we would be in the need, every time we break into a new universe, to depart from eminent, transcendent models, to have them as a kind of launching pad, and therefore immanence would be logically cut off and finality (telos) would sit comfortably as the only possibility. To be sure, when there is a telos, a finality that we cannot set off immanently, we are before the most nefarious form of transcendence. Exactly! power as potestas.” https://criticallegalthinking.com/2021/11/22/many-worlds-interpretation-critical-theory-and-the-immanent-paradox-of-power/