The international policies of the second Trump administration have caused quite an upheaval. From raising trading tariffs to (supposedly) ending wars efforts – while at the same time bombing small boast and sanctioning judges, it has not been easy to understand it. In many European countries it is now common to find institutional analysis explaining the current Trump administration international strategy as breaking apart from most of the historical US formal alliances and commitments. But I want to contribute with these reflections proposing something different: these policies are not breaking apart from previous US international strategies. They are, in fact, reenacting it. And Trump’s strategies to Latin America illustrate that well. 

I don’t believe that Trump’s policies for Latin America are completely new. In fact, I believe these policies try to mimic older American doctrines for the region – which is somehow coherent with his electoral campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again”. But different from the Roosevelt Corollary or to the Monroe doctrine of the “Big Stick,”[1] a lot of what Marco Rubio has been doing, up to now, was symbolic – it had more ideological significance than actual consequences. I believe the Trump administration policies for Latin America could be classified in two kids which sometimes overlap: the symbolic and the discretionary. “Symbolic Power,” according to Pierre Bourdieu, “can become a power of constitution”[2] – a power of classification in a political and philosophical sense. And discretionary power is precisely the non-contained and (supposedly) constitutionally authorised power that can be exercised by the government with almost as they please. Both are a constituent part of the Trump administration policies.

These two categories, when applied to international relations, can provide a strategy that make it very hard for Latin American countries, and foreign countries in general, to negotiate with the US. When your trade and political interests are discretionarily vested with a shadow of symbolism, and ideology, they might seem to lack rationality, reliability and, especially, predictability. This puts the US in a good position to negotiate, because it makes it harder for foreign diplomats to see clearly what they want. As Trump considers himself as an experienced and prime negotiator, this strategy might play well for him – and perhaps this also explains why he liked Lula da Silva – the Brazilian President – so much when they met at the UN General Assembly: Lula is another experienced negotiator, forged in union assemblies and trade union negotiations.[3]

Renaming the Gulf of Mexico is an example of this symbolic approach of US policies to Latin America. Similarly, imposing Magnitsky sanctions against Brazilian Supreme justices – for sentencing former Brazilian President (and Trump’s ally), Jair Bolsonaro, to 27 years in prison according to his crimes – has been another. On the other hand, their approach to trade tariffs in represents a clear example of their intent to act on the very constitutional limits of discretionary power – something this administration has also done internally in the US, when suspending USAID funding and challenging ivy league universities on their diversity and inclusion policies.   

However, these trade tariffs – which were imposed on different countries and sometimes seem to go beyond reason – were the first policies to have a real effect on the region. They were, still, very symbolic, as the Brazilian case shows. First, around 700 Brazilian products had a 50% tariff raise. Later, these were reduced to less than 100 products – and excluded Brazilian steel, airplanes and other important products for US trade and production. Their symbolic meaning has also been challenged by the more recent trade issues with Canada – a case which might be decided by the Supreme Court soon, who will then have to decide if a US President can act with such discretionary power on international trade policies.[4] Sinking small boats in Venezuela is also both symbolic and heavily discretionary, because it is not going to have a lasting effect on drug dealing. It boosts a symbolic image of national security, and it simultaneously tests the limits of Trump’s military actions before the US Congress.

Perhaps the only clear policies the Trump administration has implemented in Latin America are those concerning Argentina – where the Trump administration has provided a massive financial support. The support for Argentina was clearly not only a state action, but also a way to reinforce a political ally before elections – the current president of Argentina, Xavier Milei – which played out. And perhaps, because these actions are clearer, they have also provoked more backfire at home – with even republicans opposing this move.[5]

In my opinion, the most dangerous move in US current policies for Latin America is the proposal for treating drug dealers as terrorists – and possibly justifying military interventions against left-winged administrations in Colombia, Venezuela and elsewhere. This is, again, not too different from what was done during the Reagan administration, when centre-left governments were classified as “communists” to justify military interventions in the region.[6] Are we seeing a very late spin off stage of the Cold War, but now opposing the two main economies in the world, China and the US? Are Trump’s policies in Latin America caused by its breakup with China, as an ally – and the final death of Kissinger’s effort to turn China towards the USA? Are these tactics going to work for the US?

We cannot predict the future. But perhaps sinking small boats has also a deeper meaning. From a UK perspective, where far-right political parties and movements seek to blame “small boats” for illegal immigration, the US military action on the Venezuelan coast might be an unconscious manifestation of the Trump administration treatment of immigration, applied to foreign policy. The historical irony is that the UK was also saved by small boats: a fleet of small boats saved the British Army from annihilation at the hands of the fascist-led German army in Dunkirk. It is a huge irony that now, a possibly fascist-led UK might make sinking small boats as its main political strategy.

An earlier stage of these ideas were shared with Brendan Cole, who published them as an interview on Newsweek: https://www.newsweek.com/trumps-new-latin-america-strategy-10933369

A Portuguese translation of this piece was concurrently published with Revista Forum: https://revistaforum.com.br/

[1] Priscila Vieira-Souza and Marcus VAB De Matos, Imagens da América Latina:: mídia, cultura e direitos humanos (Editora Intersaberes 2021) 118–121.

[2] Pierre Bourdieu, ‘Social Space and Symbolic Power’ (1989) 7 Sociological Theory 14, 22.

[3] Trump se declara para o Lula <https://www.youtube.com/shorts/rouZEsyNKho> accessed 31 October 2025.

[4] ‘Supreme Court Changes the Rules for Upcoming Cases – Newsweek’ <https://www.newsweek.com/supreme-court-changes-rules-trump-tariff-cases-10930168> accessed 31 October 2025.

[5] ‘Trump Voters Disapprove of $40-Billion Argentina Bailout: Poll’ (Newsweek, 22 October 2025) <https://www.newsweek.com/trump-voters-disapprove-argentina-bailout-poll-10918329> accessed 31 October 2025.

[6] Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada (Companhia das Letras 2002).