In a recent piece published at Opinio Juris,^[i] Nikolas M. Rajkovic calls on international lawyers to recalibrate their “ways of seeing” to account for the multi-scalar, relational, and interconnected nature of contemporary authority and power. His article invites a critical reexamination and update of the visual and conceptual tools lawyers use to understand the world, by way of moving beyond the outdated “cartographic lens” of international law. He suggests that the discipline must recognize that what appears as a crisis of international law is, in fact, a crisis of its epistemic frameworks. This way, he contends, international law can better respond to the challenges of an epoch shaped by global flows, geopolitical dynamics, emerging networks, and infrastructures. Transformation, not collapse, is the path forward, he concludes. While Rajkovic’s call for a radical transformation in legal thinking is compelling and his writing has much to be liked about, it nonetheless, to an extent, underestimates the gravity of the moment international law faces. In times of extremes and in light of the tangible collapse of the foundational principles of international law, grappling with “cartographic anxieties,”^[ii] perhaps, should not take precedence.

Towards the Obsolescence of State Sovereignty? 

2025 ended with what a considerable part of the mainstream journalistic and academic discourse framed as “a world in crisis”: from the continuation of the bombardments and drone strikes in Kiev and in Moscow and the prolongation of the neo-colonial and, allegedly, genocidal^[iii] US-backed practices in Palestine, to the re-ignition of the civil conflicts in Sudan and the ongoing destabilization of Somalia and the partial recognition of Somaliland,^[iv] the “international community” seems to gaze on with a sense of dismay, as the post-WWII international order and its established norms appear to be systematically challenged. In what Funtowicz and Ravetz describe as the “post-normal age,”^[v] international law has likewise entered a post-normal phase, where its Westphalian cornerstone – sovereignty – is increasingly at stake.

With the onset of 2026, the United States launched a coordinated offensive against Venezuela that targeted both civilian and military infrastructure across multiple states. This operation was the culmination of a months-long escalation, during which the US conducted over 20 air strikes in the waters surrounding Venezuela under the banner of maritime interdiction. This grotesque picture was further accompanied by the unprecedented abduction (or “arrest”) of President Nicholas Maduro and Venezuela’s “first combatant,” Cilia Flores by US armed forces in the early hours of January 3^rd 2026, following a large-scale military strike against Caracas. According to the announcements and official statements of the President of the United States Donald Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Attorney General Pamela Bondi, the presidential couple was arrested and brought to New York to face “the full wrath of American justice”, since they have been officially charged with “narco-terrorism conspiracy, cocaine importation conspiracy, possession of machineguns and destructive devices, and conspiracy to possess machineguns and destructive devices against the United States.”

The act of extrajudicial abduction of the leader of a sovereign nation, alongside the presidential declarations that the US “will run Venezuela” until a “safe, proper and judicious transition” can take place, constitutes a blatant violation of the United Nations Charter, particularly Articles 1 and 2, which enshrine respect for sovereignty, the legal equality of states, and the prohibition of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Each sovereign state has exclusive authority over its territory and internal affairs, while the principle of non-intervention, a core component of sovereignty, prohibits states from coercively interfering in the domaine réservé (such as political, economic, social, and cultural systems) of other states, as established in customary international law (see Nicaragua v. United States of America)^[vi] and reinforced by the UN Charter. The US’s actions in Venezuela represent a dangerous precedent that further undermines these principles. Yet, this is no longer the “dark past” of mid-20^th century Latin America. It is a global trend that has persisted elsewhere over the past years and continues into the present, shaping the future of the so-called “international community,” ostensibly, and yet ironically, founded on sovereign equality.

The retreat of Multilateralism 

It becomes evident that such practices carry an inherent risk of providing authoritarian governments with certain justifications for similar unilateral actions. While not always successful, multilateralism has historically served to sustain an organic relationship between the international and the domestic.^[vii] In that regard, by normalizing the extraterritorial application of domestic law, bypassing even domestic democratic procedures of legitimization and not seeking international approval and cooperation, the US provides a strategic blueprint for other authoritarian regional powers seeking to dominate their neighbors or suppress dissent abroad and legitimize a world where pure might determines the reach of law. The promotion of this, rather dystopian and pre-WWII, version of international relations seems especially risky and strategically problematic during a period when global military superpowers that compete with the US for global hegemony, like Russia or China, appear more than willing to follow a similar path of using pure might to dominate weaker third states.

At the same time, multilateral bodies with previously asserted global legitimacy act as paralyzed and awkward observers to the systematic dismantling of the international legal architecture. The most prominent example of this tragic picture seems to be the EU which appears caught between its identity as a civilian and humanitarian power that champions the post-WWII order, anchored in the UN Charter, the sanctity of state sovereignty, and the self-determination of peoples, and its existential reliance on the United States that now treats the globe as its “backyard,”^[viii] having been reduced to a posture of muted concern. The awkward silence in the face of such a blatant geopolitical decapitation strike in Venezuela, reveals a rather tragic loss of agency; the Union seems unable and unwilling to condemn the hegemon’s violation of international law without endangering the very security umbrella that shields it with a post-legalist mandate of power.

Although today there are more multilateral agreements and more multilateral institutions addressing more areas of policy than ever before, their authority is undermined by unilateralism and geopolitical rivalries. The collapse of trust towards multilateral institutions can be evidenced by, among other cases, the defunding of UN humanitarian agencies,^[ix] the unilateral sanctioning of International Criminal Court (ICC) officials by major powers,^[x] and the open defiance of World Trade Organization (WTO) rulings.^[xi]

In such a world of fractured norms and unchecked might, the promise of transformation feels like a distant dream. What we are witnessing is not the cartographical re-imagination of international law, but its complete disintegration – a descent into a pre-legal order where raw power makes right. The strong bare their teeth, and unilateralism is the sole arbiter of legitimacy.

No, the crisis of international law is not merely epistemic – it is existential

This reconfiguration of international politics indicates that collapse, not transformation, is the new reality for international law. The foundational principles of international law, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the rule of law, are being systematically eroded by the resurgence of raw power politics. Historically, even dominant imperialist powers have sought to legitimize their self-serving agendas by invoking the rule of law. Even during the most blatant big-power interventions of the Cold War era, such as the Soviet suppression of the Czechoslovakian Uprising^[xii] or the American-led campaign in Korea,^[xiii] superpowers felt compelled to maintain a veneer of international legitimacy, meticulously invoking UN mandates or collective defense treaty obligations to justify their actions (like the Warsaw Pact).

The strong no longer veil their ambitions behind mandates or even the language of legality; they act with impunity and dismantle the fragile frameworks that once held the international order together. This is not simply a matter of outdated conceptual tools or a misalignment of vision. It is the unravelling of the very idea that law can constrain power. Nomos is no longer “ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς” (the ruler of all), as the ancient poet puts it.^[xiv] The crisis of international law is not merely epistemic. It is existential. International law has reached its nadir of decline. Its imminent end, then, is not merely the end of its authority, but the culmination of its inability to reconcile its universal ideals with the asymmetries of power that define modern world politics.

What is next for international lawyers?

Scholars engaged with the discipline of international law today find themselves in a Sisyphean struggle, pushing the boulder of justice and legitimacy up the hill, only to watch it roll back down with every act of impunity, every violation of sovereignty, and every erosion of the rule of law. Yet, like in Sisyphus’ myth, the futility of the task should not deter the discipline. Camus reminds us that there is meaning in the struggle itself, even if the ultimate end is unavoidable. If something must be done differently by international lawyers, we conclude, is not merely a theoretical revisiting of their conceptual tools. Surely, we do not oppose the need to rethink international law’s cartographic framing in light of the realities unfolding in the present. Yet, voicing the functional limits of this framework becomes a way of resistance to its very end; one that is imperative, because the international society of states, fundamentally rooted in the concept of territorial sovereignty, is – and will remain – inherently inconceivable without it. 

Apostolos Tsiouvalas

Postdoctoral Fellow, Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea (NCLOS), Faculty of Law, UiT The Arctic University of Norway / Senior Fellow, The Arctic Institute – Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, Washington D.C. 

Nikolaos Dimitrakopoulos

School of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece

^[i] Nikolas M. Rajkovic, ‘A World in Upheaval, International Law Out of Frame’ (19.12.25) OpinioJuris https://opiniojuris.org/2025/12/19/a-world-in-upheaval-international-law-out-of-frame/. Accessed 04 January 2025. 

^[ii] Franck Billé, ‘Introduction to “Cartographic Anxieties”’ (2016) 21 Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review. Retrieved from https://escholarship.org/uc/item/68h295gr

^[iii] Although considerably contested in the mainstream Western political discourse, the ongoing practices of the IDF in the occupied Palestinian territories have been characterized as genocidal by an increasing number of specialized analysts; see, for instance: UNHR, ‘Israel has committed genocide in the Gaza Strip, UN Commission finds’ (16.09.25) OHCHR https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/israel-has-committed-genocide-gaza-strip-un-commission-finds. Accessed 04 January 2025.

^[iv] UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, ‘Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland Triggers Sharp Divides, as Security Council Speakers Warn Move Threatens Stability in Horn of Africa’ (29.12.25) Press UN https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16270.doc.htm. Accessed 04 January 2025.

^[v] Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz, ‘Science for the post-normal age’ (1993) 25(7) Futures https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287(93)90022-L.

^[vi] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.

^[vii] José E. Alvarez, ‘Multilateralism and Its Discontents’ (2000) 11(2) European Journal of International Law 393-411.

^[viii] On this conceptualization, see: Grace Livingstone, America’s Backyard: The United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror (Zeb Books 2009); Matthew Jones, ‘America’s backyard’ (2000) 11(1) Diplomacy and Statecraft; William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992 ( The University of North Carolina Press 1998); John D. Martz (ed.), United States Policy in Latin America: A Decade of Crisis and Challenge (University of Nebraska Press 1994).

^[ix] ‘US slashes UN humanitarian aid to $2bn, huge cut as Trump demands reforms’ (29.12.25) Al Jazeera https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/12/29/us-slashes-un-humanitarian-aid-to-2bn-huge-cut-as-trump-demands-reforms#:~:text=Earlier%20this%20month%2C%20the%20UN,to%20the%20international%20aid%20sector. Accessed 04 January 2025.

^[x] ‘US sanctions on ICC officials undermine independence of tribunal and justice for victims: UN experts’ (22.08.25) UNHR  https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/08/us-sanctions-icc-officials-undermine-independence-tribunal-and-justice. Accessed 04 January 2025.

^[xi] ‘US blocks WTO proposal to fill Appellate Body vacancies for 91st time, says trade official’ (24.10.25) Reuters https://www.reuters.com/business/us-blocks-wto-proposal-fill-appellate-body-vacancies-91st-time-says-trade-2025-10-24/. Accessed 04 January 2025.

^[xii] Mark Kurlansky, 1968 : the year that rocked the world (1st ed.) (Ballantine 2004).

^[xiii] Allan R. Millett, The Korean War, Volume 1 (University of Nebraska Press 2000) 244-250.

^[xiv] Pindar, Nemean Odes. Isthmian Odes. Fragments (edited and translated by William H. Race. Loeb Classical Library 485, Harvard University Press 1997) 169a.