The 13 February 2026 decision of the High Court inHuda Ammori v Secretary of State for the Home Department that the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action was unlawful, provides a fascinating insight into the abuse of UK counterterrorism laws by public authorities to stifle legitimate dissent in the longstanding struggle to end international crimes in Palestine. The disclosure of documents in the judgment also furthers our understanding of government thinking on counter terrorism matters and how the Home Secretary came to her decision to proscribe Palestine Action. If the aim of proscription was to break the back of the Palestine Solidarity Movement, then it has spectacularly backfired.

The government has appealed the decision, and hearings have been scheduled. In the meantime, Palestine Action remains proscribed in the UK, as pending the appeal, the High Court made an order on 25 February staying its decision to quash the proscription of Palestine Action. As Professor Mark Elliott explained, ‘We are therefore left with a proscription decision (and therefore a proscription order) that is unlawful according to the court but presently unquashed’.

In this blog post, I explore the decision of the High Court to invalidate the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action, and the implications of that decision for other direction action groups. I suggest that Palestine Action has been singled out for special treatment. As I explain below, the proscription of Palestine Action is but a microcosm of global developments exacerbated by the so-called ‘War on Terrorism’ which has created a legislative framework that is now being openly abused by politicians looking for quick fixes to complex problems.

Direct Action and Palestine Action

Direct action is a method of protest where people use their own collective power —rather than relying on their elected representatives — to directly achieve political, economic, or social goals. It involves taking immediate, often disruptive action to create change or stop a problem, such as blockades, strikes, occupations, or sabotage, bypassing traditional, indirect methods like lobbying or voting.

Palestine Action describes itself as a British pro-Palestinian direct-action network. It was founded in 2020, with the stated goal of ending global participation in Israel’s ‘genocidal and apartheid regime’. The group uses direct action to disrupt the UK arms industry, which it accuses of being complicit with Israel in conducting a genocide in Palestine. This included the circulation of an ‘underground manual’ that the Police and the High Court made much of in the proceedings (§ 24-27).  For the Court, this manual was especially problematic due to its covert nature and its call to its supporters to disrupt, damage and destroy its targets through, inter alia, paint spraying, blocking drains with concrete and ‘smashing things up’. 

A specific target of Palestine Action has been Elbit Systems Limited, which is Israel’s largest military manufacturer and a major supplier of military equipment to Israel’s armed forces. At the height of the conflict in Gaza, Palestine Action targeted Elbit’s premises across the United Kingdom and those companies that enable it to conduct business here including banks, insurance companies and landlords. 

Civil disobedience and direct action 

The High Court was highly critical of Palestine Action’s methods, viewing them as illegitimate protest activity. In rejecting Palestine Action’s claim that direct action is a tradition that began with Gandhi’s satyagraha and the US Civil Rights Movement, the Court cited an earlier judgment for the contention that the only legitimate forms of civil disobedience are non-violent in nature. Such an approach is characterized by ‘restraint and acceptance of the legal consequences of their actions’ and this was ‘emphatically not the hallmarks of Palestine Action’s campaign’ (§23). The Court went so far as to claim that Palestine Action is ‘not engaged in any exercise of persuasion’ that is ‘consistent with democratic values and the rule of law’ (§23). 

Supporters of Palestine Action would, of course, contest the claim that they are not engaged in any exercise of persuasion that is consistent with democratic values and the rule of law, and such arguments have influenced juries that have refused to convict its activists in trials across the country. It is the government, they would say, that is acting contrary to those values in continuing to trade in arms with a country whose leaders have been accused of the most serious international crimes with international warrants circulated for their arrest. They could also point to the Labour government’splans to abolish jury trials and replace them with a single judge in cases where a convicted defendant would be jailed for up to three years that would apply to nearly all of Palestine Action’s defendants. Palestine Action would argue that disrupting Israel’s war machine saves lives and dramatic actions such as smashing up arms factories are more likely to attract headlines and go viral on social media. The recording and distribution of high-profile actions can therefore amount to an exercise of persuasion to a public frustrated with their government’s inability to end mass human suffering.

Following the proscription of Palestine Action in June last year, thousands of protesters have been charged by the Police under the Terrorism Act for holding up placards reading ‘I oppose genocide, I support Palestine Action’. The irony is that the proscription of Palestine Action means that non-violent protestors can now be sentenced for up to 14 years imprisonment for expressing an opinion or belief that is perceived as supportive of its work. In other words, the Terrorism Act not only proscribes acts of violence, but also non-violent acts. Those charged include vicars, priests, pensioners, war veterans, Holocaust survivors, paraplegics, and so on. 

The definition of terrorism under the Terrorism Act 2000 

Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as ‘the use or threat of action …. [d]esigned to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public …’  when ‘it is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.’ By section 1(2) of the Act ‘terrorist action’ must involve either ‘serious violence against a person’ or ‘serious damage to property.’  

It is therefore apparent, and was recognised at the time, that the definition of terrorism under the Terrorism Act is extraordinary broad. Palestine Action remains listed in the Home Office paper, ‘Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations’ that was last updated in January.  Palestine Action is listed alongside groups including Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, Boko Haram, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as ISIS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, along with 14 organisations in Northern Ireland, and Neo Nazi and White Supremacist groups.

In his witness statement to the Court, Professor Ben Saul, the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter Terrorism and Human Rights, challenged the UK’s definition of terrorism. He expressed his view that ‘direct action protest causing serious damage to property is not, without more, sufficient to qualify as an act of terrorism in international law’. He explained that most international law definitions of terrorism ‘require acts intended to cause death, serious injury or hostage taking’.

The decision of the High Court

Of course, the High Court cannot strike down an Act of Parliament under our constitution. It cannot reformulate the definition of terrorism enacted by Parliament. As the Court explained in its response to the Special Rapporteur, the Home Secretary was required by law to rely, and to only rely on, the definition of terrorism in the 2000 Terrorism Act: ‘Had she purported to rely on any other definition for the purposes of her decision she would have acted unlawfully’ (§ 142).

And yet, remarkably, given its apparent lack of sympathy for the methods of Palestine Action, the High Court held that the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe the group was unlawful. It did so on two grounds. First, it found that that Home Secretary’s decision was contrary to her own policy, as it took into consideration extraneous ‘other factors’, such as the ‘significant disruptive benefits beyond current policing powers to deal with Palestine Action’ (§ 39 and §89). These included discrediting Palestine Actions’ brand, deterring individuals from supporting it, and reducing the burden on the police force, as stretched as it was, rather than focusing solely on the extent to which Palestine Action’s activities concerned terrorism.

The Court found that these ‘other factors’ went beyond the exercise of discretion available to the Home Secretary under the Terrorism Act 2000, which described a power, and not a duty, to proscribe. In other words, the Court emphasised that the Home Secretary had a discretion not to proscribe an organisation as a terrorist organisation even if it met the statutory definition of terrorism under the Act. The Court explained that what was required was a comprehensive, qualitative assessment of whether a group is concerned with terrorism – and not the benefits of proscription for making the police force’s work easier.  The Court held that this was not a relevant consideration and was therefore unlawful (§ 90).

Second, the Court found that the proscription amounted to a significant interference with the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly under the European Convention on Human Rights and was disproportionate under the test established by the Supreme Court in the Bank Mellat case. A fair balance was not struck. Only a very small amount of Palestine Action’s activities amounted terrorism. (The Home Office conceded that only three out of 385 direct actions met the statutory definition of terrorism (§17). These were the incidents targeting defence firms at Glasgow, Bristol and Kent). The Court was of the view that most of the offences that supporters of Palestine Action were engaged with could be dealt with through ordinary criminal laws such as the Criminal Damage Act of 1971, with a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, aggravated burglary under the Theft Act of 1968, with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, and committing grievous bodily harm with intent under the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861, which also has a maximum sentence of life imprisonment (see § 139).

For this reason, the High Court concluded that the nature and scale of Palestine Action’s activities in so far as they ‘concern terrorism’, as defined under the Terrorism Act 2000, had ‘not yet reached the level, scale and persistence’ that would justify proscription (§ 140). Accordingly, this provided an additional ground for finding that the Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe Palestine Action was unlawful. 

The implications of proscription for other direct-action groups

What caught my eye when reading the High Court’s decision was an argument that was raised by the claimant which was addressed by the Court towards the end of its judgment (see §143 and §144). This was the claim that the proscription of Palestine Action gave rise to an unjustified difference in treatment compared to similar direct actions groups on grounds of race, national origin and or political opinion. The Court describes this claim as ‘a short but decisive point’ (§144) but did not elaborate on what it meant by that. The Court found nothing in the evidence before it to show that these organisations had committed offences within section 1 of the Terrorism Act. 

Given just how widely drafted the definition of terrorism is, it is not entirely inconceivable that actions undertaken by other direct action groups including Extinction Rebellion and Just Stop Oil could meet the definition of terrorism if the Home Office was to apply the same logic that it applied in their decision to proscribe Palestine Action. Extinction Rebellion, for example, is a direct-action network, like Palestine Action, which has frequently broken the law in the UK to achieve its aims, through acts of civil disobedience, resulting in hundreds of arrests. Its actions have included criminal damage to buildings, such as smashing windows of the London headquarters of HSBC Bank or spraying paint at Shell HQ and blocking public infrastructure to cause disruption. Six years ago, The Guardian and the BBC reported that Extinction Rebellion had been listed as an ‘extreme organization’ in a police guidebook published by Counter Terrorism Police in Southeast England alongside groups like the neo-Nazi group National Action. Just Stop Oil activists forced police to close sections of the M25 ring road, and other parts of London, which the police claimed had blocked ambulances endangering lives.

Accordingly, the suggestion, raised in the proceedings that Palestine Action was being singled out for exceptionally harsh treatment, is not far-fetched. As Dr. Laurence Teillet has explained, even environmental groups like Greenpeace and Sea Shepherd Conservation Society have engaged in illegal activities on the high seas, such as endangering lives, sinking vessels, and causing damage to property. They have even been prosecuted under antipiracy laws in several jurisdictions, most of which have been unsuccessful I should add. But what if these groups had been defined as proscribed terrorist groups?  Would that make it easier to prosecute them than relying on antiquated anti-piracy laws? Where do we draw the line between permissible and unlawful protest activity? Why has Palestine Action been singled out, ostensibly, for special treatment? Why is there this double standard?

The double standard

I would suggest that there is an historical explanation for this double standard that has a lot to do with British foreign and defence policy. As was disclosed in the proceedings at the High Court, the Home Office is required to take into account several factors in its decision to proscribe, including ‘the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism’. In her statement justifying her decision to proscribe, the Home Secretary referred to the group’s nationwide campaign targeting key national infrastructure and defence firms that provide services and supplies to support Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘Five Eyes’ allies and the UK defence enterprise.

As the late Professor Conor Gearty (1957-2025) argued in his last book, Homeland Insecurity: The Rise and Rise of Global Anti-Terrorism Law (2024), Israel’s success in recasting Palestinian liberation movements seeking an end to Israel’s prolonged and unlawful occupation of Palestinian territories as ‘terrorists’ that pose a threat to western civilisation as a whole, is a major factor. By persuading the world that the Palestinian question was one of ‘global terrorism’ rather than ‘national liberation’, ‘violent groups scattered about the “civilised” world became not discreet fighters to be assessed on their merits but offshoots of one dramatic scourge, the terrorism whose proponents were waging war on the West’ (p. 204).  

And we can see that there is merit to this argument when we look at the list of proscribed organisations on the Home Office website, which includes Palestinian armed groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, even though these groups have never launched attacks against the U.K. or targeted British citizens. And now Palestine Action (but not Extinction Rebellion) is listed alongside these groups. 

Reading between the lines: the real reason Palestine Action was proscribed 

It seems to me that it is the size and success of Palestine Action’s activities in protesting international crimes in Gaza, and the widespread public support it received that cost the government so much to police that led it to being singled out for special treatment as being especially problematic. The trigger that led to its proscription was the incident in which three Palestine Action activists broke into RAF Brize Norton and damaged two military planes with spray paint. However, as revealed in the documents disclosed in the proceedings, the decision to proscribe Palestine Action has been under consideration prior to that event.

The real reason for proscription – as the Court implicitly recognised – was because the Home Office understood that juries were prone to issue not guilty verdicts in response to attempts to prosecute direct action activists – as they had done in respect of activists from Extinction Rebellion who were let off (see here and here). And indeed, following the proscription of Palestine Action, juries have refused to convict Palestine Action activists of aggravated burglary, criminal damage and violent disorder. Proscribing Palestine Action and abolishing most jury trials will make it much easier for future Courts to convict them. 

Whether the Court of Appeal will agree with the High Court or the government remains to be seen. In the meantime, Palestine Action remains a proscribed group, and it remains an offence, inter alia, to invite support for it, to express an opinion or belief that is supportive of its work, or to wear clothing or carry or display articles in public in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the individual is a member or supporter of Palestine Action. We can only hope that the Court of Appeal agrees with the High Court (even if not with all its reasoning) otherwise I fear darker days ahead as the law becomes an instrument of oppression with consequences going well beyond the targeting of Palestine Action activists to crack down on the already serious problem of academic freedom in this country. 

This is an expanded version of my presentation on the plenary panel on protest & progress at the Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLSA) annual conference at Sussex University on 30 March 2026.