Several weeks ago, UK courts dealt a blow to the legal system in two cases. Both involve the group “Palestine Action”, whose aim is to end global complicity in the genocide in Gaza. The first case involves its proscription as a terrorist organization (on the same degree as groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda), initially ruled unlawful by the High Court but reversed on government appeal. The second case, which I will be closely examining in this article, involves criminal damage committed by four members of Palestine Action, who damaged property in an Israeli weapons manufacturing company, Elbit Systems. Despite being on trial for criminal damage, the prosecution raised the option of sentencing the “Filton 4,” as called in the media, through section 69 of the Sentencing Code, which allows for these members to be sentenced as having a “terrorist connection” despite never being charged with that crime, or any form of terrorism. Amongst wide public backlash and human rights organizations urging the Judge to reconsider how this affects the defendants and the reputation of British law, on the 12th of June 2026, Justice Johnson sentenced Charlotte Head, Samuel Corner, Leona Kamio, and Fatema Rajwani, for criminal damage with a terrorist connection, meaning they will serve a longer time in prison before being allowed to apply for parole and would be labelled and viewed as terrorists by the police for 15 years.

The defense used multiple arguments to claim why sentencing these citizens using section 69 was unconstitutional, and despite most of their arguments being rejected, upon reading Justice Johnson’s judgment, there appear to be crucial lapses, contradictions, and potential judicial bias. Exploiting the law’s loopholes puts these young adults in an unfair position and sets a dangerous precedent for direct action.

Articles 6 and 7

The defense invoked Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998, “Right to a Fair Trial,” in the context of Article 7, “No Punishment Without Law”. As part of the defense, Ms. O’Raghallaigh made two other submissions after her first, one of which I believe was unfairly rejected.

She claimed that Article 7 was a common-law right and that section 69 of the Act was contrary to common-law principles. While the judge agreed that Article 7 did reflect the common law, he emphasized parliamentary supremacy in paragraph 59, using R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, to say that it was not up to the courts to decline to apply section 69 since, if the legislation is inconsistent with pre-existing principles, the more recent act should be followed. Yet, he also explained that legislation must not be interpreted in a way that overrides fundamental rights unless that is clearly parliament’s intent, as shown through “express language or necessary implication” as per R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Simms [1999] 2 AC 1155. He then stated that here, the parliamentary intent was to extend the definition of terrorism to include serious damage to property, and that if this overrides fundamental rights, it was parliament’s choice to do so. However, as Justice Johnson made clear, the intent to violate these rights must be explicitly stated, and that intent is not present in section 69 or in the Sentencing Act as a whole. It does not matter that Parliament’s intention was only to expand the definition of terrorism because they should have explicitly recognized the potential infringement within the legislation. As per Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), express repeal is needed when the law deals with the state and citizen, or if it enlarges or diminishes the scope of what is constitutional, the latter being the case here. This principle was further confirmed in Re Allister [2023] UKSC 5, where the Supreme Court did claim that labeling legislation as constitutional was purely academic, yet also endorsed the idea that legislation can only be modified by express words in a later statute. Justice Johnson’s emphasis on parliamentary supremacy is understandable, but he turns a blind eye to a clear constitutional error.

Another aspect of Article 6 that was not fully explored in this case, which could make this trial unfair, is the admissibility of evidence. The defense submitted at trial that there was insufficient evidence to determine the defendant’s subjective motivations, as stated in paragraph 24, because the defense was not permitted to give evidence on that issue. The Guardian also reported similarly, that in a ruling on the 21st of April for criminal damages, the defendants could not give evidence of motivating factors including, in Justice Johnson’s words, “their reasons for joining Palestine Action, their beliefs about Elbit’s supply of weapons to Israel for the use in the war in Gaza, their views about the actions of Israel in Gaza or its legality or their purpose in causing damage to property at the factory beyond an intention to destroy it or any other evidence which is irrelevant to the issues which the jury are required to determine”. Yet, in this trial in which the Filton 4 were sentenced with a terrorist connection, he stated in paragraph 28, “They have each given extensive evidence, including as to their motivations, and including at the first trial (where evidence of their motivation was admissible on the aggravated burglary charge).” These statements seem contradictory. Their motivations were allowed at trial for the aggravated burglary charge, and the jury acquitted them. Yet, their motivations were ruled irrelevant in another trial by jury involving their criminal damages, with the judge (not the jury) being fully aware of the possibility of a terrorist connection sentence if they were convicted. Then, conveniently, their motivations were brought back into the mix to determine whether their actions fell under the definition of terrorism. This determination of when their motivations were or were not relevant seems like a procedural manipulation, making this an unfair trial by only allowing their motivations as evidence when they can be used as an aggravating factor. This conduct reflects a serious abuse of the UK legal system and process, demonstrating a grossly imbalanced trial.

But the bias of Justice Johnson does not seem to stop there, and the campaign group “Defend our Juries” filed a formal complaint with the Judicial Conduct Investigations Office on the 5th of June, alleging discriminatory conduct. Of course, this trial shows that it was unsuccessful, but that does not deny the merit of the extensive evidence this complaint provides for the recusal of Justice Johnson. In addition to what I explained regarding evidence of motivation, the defense’s desire to remove Justice Johnson came from his failed attempt to have the lead defense barrister, Rajiv Menon KC, prosecuted for contempt of the court. The charge comes from his alleged breach of the judge’s direction that barristers were not permitted to explain to the jury their right to acquit on the basis of conscience, known as jury equity. Frankly, it does not seem far-fetched to assume that the High Court’s refusal to entertain Justice Johnson’s claim might have motivated him to take his anger out on Menon’s client through their sentences.

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Article 14

This prejudice extends from the judge to his judgment, including his skewed perception of discrimination. This case is the first in which a criminal damage charge amounted to a sentence with a terrorist connection. But Justice Johnson rejected the use of Article 14 of the ECHR, “Prohibition of Discrimination”, to argue these citizens were being discriminated against due to the Palestinian cause. Yet, by examining similar cases, one can see that there may be grounds for a discrimination claim. In R v. Bramwell et al [2021], the jury acquitted six protestors part of the organization Extinction Rebellion, charged with criminal damage for spray painting slogans and breaking windows at Shell’s headquarters.  Likewise, in R v Rhian Graham, Milo Ponsford, Jake Skuse and Sage Willoughby [2022], the “Colston 4” were acquittedby the jury for criminal damage after toppling a statue of a slave trader during the Black Lives Matter protests. If we apply the same criteria that the Filton 4 faced under the Sentencing Act 2020 and the Terrorism Act 2000, the actions in these cases could be considered to have a terrorist connection too. They influence the government (as practically any protest intends to do) in pressuring them to decrease their reliance on fossil fuels or to stop honouring slave traders. They were both made for advancing an ideological cause, whether it be environmental or against racial discrimination, and both caused serious damage to property. No terrorism connection was pursued because their actions never amounted to a sentence, possibly because the defendants were freely able to express their motivations. To continue to the opposite side of the political spectrum, when the Southport far-right riots occurred in 2024, the majority of the offenses charged were violent disorder, although 28 people faced criminal damage offenses. While some did face prison sentences, none of them were sentenced as having a terrorist connection. So why is it that this case involving activists destroying weapons they believed would be used to kill Palestinians is the one to break precedent?

Conscientious Objection

If all else fails (which it has so far), one last thing that Justice Johnson dismissed in his ruling was conscientious objection, as he stated that the defense’s actions were not characterized by restraint or acceptance of legal consequences, and so therefore their motivations for the crime could not qualify as a mitigating factor, only an aggravating factor, as section 69 requires. Yet, in his own words, when explaining how the defendant’s actions satisfy the requirement of intimidating the public, he clearly states in paragraph 45.4 that these defendants, “intend[ed] to carry out the most serious form of action and intend[ed] to be arrested for it”. Surely, if he himself affirms that these four were intended to be arrested for their actions, that can qualify as an acceptance of legal consequences. This evidence would mean that their motivations could have been used as a mitigating factor under conscientious objection, but Justice Johnson completely overlooked his own contradiction inasmuch as motivations were included only in assessing aggravating factors and not elsewhere, even if relevant and required at other stages of analysis. What is also interesting is that Justice Johnson acknowledges the suffragettes in paragraph 70 of this section of the judgment, citing R v Jones [2006] UKHL 16 to state that the Filton 4 did not have conscientious objection. He praises the suffragettes’ actions for their ability to revolutionize UK politics while ignoring that they used far greater violence, like planting bombs in crowded areas and committing arson. 

Ultimately, the failure in this case shows the dangers of what UK law is becoming. While I believe in the powers of parliament, courts are supposed to act as guardians of the rule of law, equality, and fairness, even if only symbolically, through a declaration of incompatibility. But that is not what we saw with this case. Instead, we saw a biased judge insistent on sentencing young adults for a crime they were never charged with. We also see the inherent harm of the legislation through section 69 of the Sentencing Act, acting as a loophole to sentence people as terrorists, or even the Terrorism Act and its incredibly broad definition of terrorism, which gives an avenue for charges of property damage to evolve into terrorism. This ruling only further confirms the crackdown by courts, legislation, and the government on anyone questioning the continuous violence that our society has normalized. After legislation such as the Public Order Act 2023 and the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, the ruling in this case only confirms the increasing barriers that protestors face under criminal law. Justice yields to bias and inequity once again, reflecting the troubling direction of our current legal system.